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Numerous studies have found that people tend to commit prosocial acts subsequent to
previous immoral acts, as a response to the latter. This phenomenon is called moral
cleansing or moral compensation. However, the specific mechanism how previous
immoral acts motivate moral compensatory behaviors is still not fully understood. This
study aimed to examine the roles of guilt and moral identity in the relation between
previous immoral acts and subsequent prosocial behaviors to clarify the mechanism.
Based on the extant research, the current study proposed a moderated mediation
model to illustrate the process of moral cleansing. Specifically, a previous immoral act
motivates guilt, which further leads to subsequent prosocial behaviors, while moral
identity facilitates this process. The participants were primed by a recalling task (immoral
act vs. a neutral event). The results support the hypothesized model and provide a
framework that explains moral cleansing by integrating the roles of guilt and moral
identity. These findings highlight the dynamic nature of people’s morality with regard
to how people adapt moral behaviors to protect their moral self-image.
Keywords: moral cleansing, moral compensation, ethical dissonance, moral identity, guilt, moral self-image
INTRODUCTION
Past research shows us that people behave dishonestly, but at the same time manage to perceive
themselves as good and honest (Mazar et al., 2008; Jordan et al., 2011; Shalvi et al., 2015). According
to the common theoretical model of self-maintenance, people are torn between their wish to be
moral and the temptation to profit from dishonesty. This conflict is termed ethical dissonance
(Barkan et al., 2012, 2015). Ethical dissonance elicits intense psychological tension and poses a
threat to people’s self-concept and well-being (Mulder and Aquino, 2013; Barkan et al., 2015).
To reduce the tension and maintain the moral self, people use justification mechanisms. Some
justifications can take place before people commit the ethical violation, such as ambiguity of rules,
the prosocial nature of the act, and moral licensing (Shalvi et al., 2015). They enable people to
excuse misbehaviors as less immoral and thus reduce anticipated ethical dissonance. More often,
other justifications emerge after people’s moral misconduct, in order to minimize the experienced
dissonance, wipe out feelings of guilt, and cleanse the self.
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Moral cleansing, also known as moral compensation, is a set
of compensating moral or worthy actions that cancels out the
ethical violation that preceded it, allowing a person to turn a
new leaf (Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006; Sachdeva et al., 2009).
This effect has been largely documented in previous research
and shows the inconsistency in morality (Jordan et al., 2011;
Conway and Peetz, 2012; Gino et al., 2015). For instance, it
was showed that people who recollected their past immoral
behaviors showed high enthusiasm for prosocial activities and
less dishonesty than those who recalled their past moral behaviors
(Jordan et al., 2011; Gino et al., 2015). Conway and Peetz (2012)
also found that participants who were asked to write their own
past immoral behaviors reported stronger willingness to offer
help and donate more money to charity. Since moral cleansing
has been demonstrated by various studies, it is important to
explore why “sinners” act prosocially after their misdeeds. In this
context, we need to consider two key factors.
GUILT AND MORAL CLEANSING
Guilt is one of the negative consequences of ethical dissonance
(Tangney, 1990; Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006). It is a measurable
aspect of the psychological tension of ethical dissonance
(Tangney et al., 2007). Research has shown that guilt has a unique
role in ethical dissonance (Gino et al., 2009; Sheikh and Janoff-
Bulman, 2010; Xu et al., 2014). As the dissonance is more acute,
the feelings of guilt increase, which may put more pressure on the
individual to reduce the threat of ethical dissonance on the self.
Cleansing can be an effective way to reduce that tension (Barkan
et al., 2015). Thus, as people feel more guilt, their tendency
for cleansing will increase. Specifically, we hypothesize that an
immoral act motivates guilt, which further leads to subsequent
prosocial behaviors.
MORAL IDENTITY AND MORAL
CLEANSING
Interestingly, people can feel more or less guilt. Some people
may feel very guilty because they took a newspaper without
paying for it, while other people may do worse things like
stealing thousands and feel less guilty. This indicates the
individual differences in people’s response to their past immoral
act, consistently immoral act (e.g., stealing), or inconsistently
compensatory act (e.g., donating money or helping others; Zhong
and Liljenquist, 2006; Martens et al., 2010). Past research has
shown that everyone wants to be moral and sees morality as
an important part of their identity (Blasi, 1993). Fine-tuning
this concept, Aquino and Reed (2002) referred to the centrality
of moral identity to one’s self-concept. They showed that, for
some people, moral identity is an important and central part
of their general identity, whereas for other people (who also
see themselves as moral) this component is less central (Aquino
and Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009). We hypothesize that, as
moral identity is more central to one’s self-concept, he or she
will be more susceptible to ethical dissonance, experience more
psychological tension, and act more prosocially to minimize this
distress.
Moral identity is defined as “a self-conception organized
around a set of moral traits” and it reflects the self-importance
of morality (Aquino and Reed, 2002). The trait-based definition
stems from Blasi’s (1984) thought that some moral traits (e.g.,
caring or helpful) may stand more centrally in one’s self-concept
than others (e.g., honest or generous). Aroused by the drive to
maintain consistency between self-conception and action, moral
identity contributes to motivate moral actions, as a self-regulation
(Blasi, 2004; Aquino et al., 2009; Brooks et al., 2013). Specifically,
people spontaneously compare their current actions with their
moral self-conception, and once the comparative deficit or the
threat to their moral self is detected, the psychological distress
is generated (Barkan et al., 2015; West and Zhong, 2015).
This suggests that the centrality of moral identity facilitates
the evoking of guilt and compensatory behavior in ethical
dissonance (Zhong et al., 2010). Further, Mulder and Aquino
(2013) conducted an empirical research on the relationship
between moral identity and moral cleansing. The results showed
a facilitating effect of moral identity on moral compensatory
behavior.
THE CURRENT STUDY
Based on the theoretical models and existing findings related
to ethical dissonance, we presumed the process of moral
cleansing by integrating the roles of guilt and moral identity
simultaneously. Specifically, when committing an immoral or
indecent act, people will experience stronger discrepancy between
their behaviors and existing moral identity, which can elicit guilt
(Jordan et al., 2011; Mulder and Aquino, 2013). The higher a
person’s moral identity is, the stronger guilt he/her feels. The
desire to reduce the guilt can motivate them to engage in moral
actions to protect their moral self-image, or in other words, to
wash away their sins (West and Zhong, 2015).
Correspondingly, we proposed a moderated mediation model
to illustrate the roles of guilt and moral identity in moral
cleansing. To be specific, guilt mediates the relationship between
previous immorality and moral compensatory acts, whereas
moral identity plays a moderating role in this process. It is
necessary to examine moral cleansing from a cross-cultural
perspective before illustrating its process, and it has never been
demonstrated among Chinese who grew up in an oriental cultural
background. Thus, in this study we examined this assumption in
a sample of Chinese young adults. Above all, this study aimed
(1) to examine the moral cleansing effect in a Chinese sample,
and (2) to clarify the roles of guilt and moral identity and their
interplay in moral cleansing. The corresponding hypotheses were
as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Previous immorality will motivate the tendency
to offer help.
Hypothesis 2: Guilt will mediate the relationship between
previous immorality and moral compensatory acts, and moral
identity will play a positive moderating role in this process.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
In total, 360 Chinese adults participated in this online study via
Sojump. They were provided a chance to win a raﬄe prize of
U100 (about $15). On an average, these participants were aged
23.74 years (SD = 5.98 years), ranging from 18 to 38 years.
Further, 169 participants (47%) were male and 210 participants
(58%) were undergraduate students.
Design
To examine the moral cleansing effect, the participants were
randomly distributed to different recalling tasks: recalling their
own previous immoral acts for the primed group (n = 180) and
recalling their own neutral acts for the unprimed group (n= 180).
To further clarify the association among previous immoral
behavior, guilt, moral identity, and moral compensatory behavior,
the last three variables were measured and the immorality of
previous immoral behavior was evaluated on a 4-point scale
(0 = neutral, 1 = a little immoral, 2 = moderately immoral, and
3= very immoral).
Measures
Moral Identity
The internalization subscale of the moral identity measure
(Aquino and Reed, 2002) was used to assess the centrality of
moral identity. This subscale of the two-dimensional instrument
has been shown to tap into the degree to which moral traits
are central to the self-concept (Aquino and Reed, 2002) and
has been used in several studies on moral functioning (Aquino
et al., 2009; Mulder and Aquino, 2013). The measure presents
participants with a list of nine adjectives that might describe
a person (generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind caring,
compassionate, fair, and friendly) and then asks them to
“visualize the kind of person who has these characteristics and
imagine how that person would think, feel, and act.” After
being asked to think about someone who possesses these traits,
participants were presented with the five items. Sample items
included, “Being someone who has these characteristics is an
important part of who I am,” and “It would make me feel good to
be a person who has these characteristics.” Each of the items was
answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree
and 7 = strongly agree). Then, the five items were averaged
to determine the moral identity score for each participant
(α= 0.85).
Priming Manipulation Using the Recalling Task
The priming manipulation used a procedure designed by
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006), which had been used in several
studies (Barkan et al., 2012; Mulder and Aquino, 2013; Jordan
et al., 2015). At the beginning of the priming, all participants
read instructions stating that the researchers were interested
in exploring people’s memory of daily life events. Then, the
participants in the primed group was asked to recall one of
their past unethical events and to describe any details, feelings,
or emotions they experienced, while participants in the control
group were asked to write down certain occurrences that had
happened since a week ago until the present (Mulder and
Aquino, 2013). We coded the immorality of the recalled acts
by the method adapted from Jordan et al. (2011). According
to Kaptein’s (2008) definition, for immoral behavior: “violating
significant (social) moral norms that are acceptable to the
larger community,” the immorality of the recalled acts was
evaluated on a 4-point scale (0 = neutral, 1 = a little immoral,
2=moderately immoral, 3= very immoral). This method helped
in understanding the association between previous immorality
and compensatory behavior. The intraclass correlation coefficient
(ICC = 0.84) showed a high initial interrater reliability; three
coders discussed discrepancies to arrive at a consensus.
Guilt
At the end of the recall task, all participants were presented
with the guilt scale (GS; Ding, 2015) to measure their current
feelings of guilt, which was adapted from Tangney et al. (1996)
and Lewis’s (1971) measurements. The guilt scale consists of 16
items, with five items in the dimensions of realizing one’s own
error (α= 0.86), six items in the dimension of feeling (α= 0.91),
and five items in the dimensions of behavior tendency (α= 0.83).
Respondents answered each question on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree). The Cronbach’s
alpha reliabilities indicated that the GS achieved optimal levels as
per psychometric requirements.
The Tendency of Volunteering Behavior
A method revised from Schnall et al.’s (2010) measure was utilized
to measure the tendency of volunteering behavior. Specifically,
after completing the guilt scale, the participants were informed
that the study had ended. Then, a window popped up to show the
“Ask for help” situation. The window stated, “There is another
survey for which we need your help, without any pay. Any
amount of help would be greatly appreciated. You are free to
decide whether you will be willing to help us and to choose the
time you wish to spend on the survey before the survey starts.”
The time ranged from 0 to 120 min, at intervals of 10 min.
According to Korsgaard et al.’s (2010) study, the experimenter
should state that the participants (a) would receive no incentive
for participating and (b) were not obligated to participate. As
Korsgaard et al. (2010) explain, it is a valid measure to assess
the participants’ volunteering behavior. The given answers were
encoded to 0–12 (ranging from volunteering no time to 2 h, in
10-min increments), according to Oswald’s (1996, 2002) method.
Thus, the tendency toward volunteering behavior was measured
and encoded.
Procedure
The Institutional Review Board of Zhejiang Normal University
in China approved the protocol of the present study, including
the consent procedure. We also obtained consent from our
participants. All materials and measures were completed online,
anonymously. At the beginning of the on-line survey, the moral
identity of all participants was measured, after which, some
filler questionnaires (about 30 items) unrelated to morality were
filled. Then, the participants in the two groups were primed or
controlled with different recalling tasks, respectively. Next, the
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guilt scale was used to measure the guilt of all the participants.
Last, all subjects participated in a test for participants’ prosocial
intentions in a simulated “Ask for help” situation. In total, nine
participants were excluded for failing to recall their previous
immoral acts in the primed group, and 13 participants were
excluded for their invalid questionnaires (six in the primed group
and seven in the unprimed group), which involved choosing the
same, completely random, or contradicting options for the items.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Before testing our predictions, we described the study variables
using means and standard deviations of the measures, which
have been shown in Table 1. Then, the Pearson correlation
analysis was conducted to explore the basic relationships between
previous immorality, guilt, moral identity, and helping time.
These results are also presented in Table 1, indicating that the
compensatory prosocial behavior was positively correlated with
previous immorality, guilt, and moral identity.
Hypothesis Testing
The chi-square test and one-way ANOVA were conducted to
examine Hypothesis 1. First, the chi-square test showed that
66.86% of the participants in the primed group offered help,
whereas only 34.27% of participants in the unprimed group did
so (χ2 = 14.992, p < 0.001, 8 = 0.21). Then, the results of the
ANOVA showed a significantly different tendency for engaging
in volunteering behavior between the primed and control groups
(primed group: 3.89± 1.81; control group: 2.80± 1.64; t = 5.71,
p< 0.001, Cohen’s d= 0.63). As predicted, relative to the control
group, recalling previous immoral behavior in the primed group
motivated moral compensatory intentions. Before examining the
hypothesized moderated mediation model, we tested the effect
of previous immorality on subsequent prosocial behavior using
a regression analysis. The result (B = 0.25, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001)
indicated that every 1-unit increase in the previous immorality
predicted a 0.25-unit increase in moral compensatory behavior.
To examine the association among previous immorality,
guilt, moral identity, and compensatory behavior, we tested
the moderated mediation model (Hypothesis 2) according to
Muller et al.’s (2005) multiple regression analysis process with
centered variables (Aiken et al., 1991). The regression analysis
was conducted using the enter method. Bootstrap confidence
intervals (CI) were computed for the regressions coefficients and
95% CI not containing 0 indicates significant results (Erceg-Hurn
and Mirosevich, 2008). The results have been presented in Table 2
and Figure 1.
First, previous immorality had a significantly indirect effect on
subsequent prosocial behavior through guilt. To be specific, the
path from previous immorality to guilt and the path from guilt
to subsequent prosocial behavior were significant. The indirect
effect (from previous immorality to the subsequent prosocial
behavior through guilt) equaled 0.06, which was the product of
0.46 (the path from previous immorality to guilt) and 0.13 (the
path from guilt to prosocial behavior). In addition, the direct
effect of previous immorality on prosocial behavior reduced from
0.25 to 0.19 after guilt was added to the model. This indicated
the partial mediating effect of guilt in the relationship between
previous immorality and prosocial behavior, and the mediating
effect made up 24% (0.06/0.25) of the total effect. Moreover, for
the analysis on helping time, the adjusted R2 increased from 0.22
to 0.35 when guilt was added in the third step. That is, guilt had
an additional R2 value of 13%.
Secondly, the moderating effect of moral identity was shown
on the direct and indirect path of moral compensation.
Specifically, the interaction of previous immorality and moral
identity (PIMI) had a significant effect on guilt and prosocial
behavior. To present the moderating role of moral identity in
moral compensation, we plotted the two interactions in Figures 2
and 3, at different levels of previous immorality (0–3) and
moral identity centrality (1 SD above and below the mean for
high and low levels). Figure 2 illustrates the effects of previous
immorality on subsequent helping time while Figure 3 shows
the effects of previous immorality on guilt for high and low
levels of moral identity centrality. As shown in Figure 2, there
is a stronger moral cleansing effect for people who have a
high centrality of moral identity (high-MI) than for people who
have a low centrality of moral identity (low-MI) at Level 3
[Mhigh−MI = 1.49, Mlow−MI = 0.87, t(39) = 1.97, p < 0.05,
Cohen’s d = 0.62]. As presented in Figure 3, stronger guilt was
elicited for high-MI people than for low-MI people at almost all
levels of immorality [Level 1: Mhigh−MI = 0.06, Mlow−MI = -0.83,
t(30) = 2.54, p< 0.01, Cohen’s d= 0.89; Level 2: Mhigh−MI = 0.64,
Mlow−MI = 0.24, t(48) = 1.43, p< 0.10, Cohen’s d= 0.40; Level 3:
Mhigh−MI = 0.94, Mlow−MI = 0.43, t(39) = 1.70, p< 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.51].
DISCUSSION
This study had revealed a moral cleansing effect among Chinese
young adults. More importantly, the results supported the
assumptive model and provided a framework for explaining
moral compensation by integrating the roles of guilt and moral
identity. Specifically, previous immorality elicits the feeling of
guilt, which further motivates moral compensatory behavior to
alleviate this psychological distress. Moral identity facilitates the
process of moral cleansing directly or through eliciting strong
guilt.
Moral compensation exists both in eastern and western
cultures, indicating that moral compensation is a cross-cultural
phenomenon. Specifically, compared with the percentages of
participants (66.7 and 33.3%) who chose a cleansing product
(i.e., an antiseptic wipe, versus a non-cleansing product, i.e.,
a pencil) in Zhong and Liljenquist’s (2006) study, the present
study revealed a similar percentage in the primed (66.86%) and
unprimed (34.27%) groups in terms of the tendency to offer help.
However, a difference was found between the percentage of those
who offered help in the present study and of those who did so
(73.9 and 40.9%) in Zhong and Liljenquist’s (2006) study. These
comparisons showed a similar effect of moral compensation and
a different level of helping behavior in participants from different
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
Content of recalling task
Neutral (n = 173) Immoral (n = 165)
M SD 1 2 3 4 M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Immorality 0 0 − 1.97 0.82 −
2. Guilt 0.60 0.14 − − 5.20 1.27 0.55∗∗ −
3. Moral identity 4.97 0.86 − 0.48∗∗ − 5.04 0.89 0.08 0.52∗∗ −
4. Helping time 3.89 1.81 − 0.33∗∗ 0.19∗ - 2.80 1.64 0.27∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.23∗∗ −
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
Morality of the recalled act ranges from 0 (neutral) to 3 (very immoral). Guilt scores range from 1 (strongly disagree e) to 7 (strongly agree). Moral identity scores range
from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Helping time ranges from 0 (no help) to 12 (120 min).
TABLE 2 | The regression results for moderated mediation model.
Predictor variables The first step Helping time The second step Guilt The third step Helping time
B SE 95%CI B SE 95%CI B SE 95%CI
X: Previous immorality (PI) 0.25 0.04 [0.16, 0.34] 0.46 0.03 [0.39, 0.53] 0.19 0.03 [0.12, 0.26]
Mo: Moral identity (MI) 0.08 0.04 [−0.02, 0.18] 0.09 0.03 [−0.01, 0.19] 0.07 0.04 [−0.01, 0.13]
XMo: PIMI 0.11 0.04 [0.03, 0.19] 0.14 0.03 [0.08, 0.20] 0.12 0.04 [0.04, 0.22]
Me: Guilt (G) − − − − 0.13 0.03 [0.05, 0.21]
MeMo: GMI − − − − −0.05 0.03 [−0.10, 0.01]
Adj R2 0.22 0.48 0.35
F 19.21 144.18 23.47
Mo, moderator variable; Me, mediator variable.
cultural backgrounds. Extending previous findings (Zhong and
Liljenquist, 2006; Conway and Peetz, 2012), the present study
also found the quantitative association that a 1-unit increase
in the previous immorality predicted a 0.25-unit increase in
moral compensatory behavior. The findings indicated that the
higher level of previous immorality that people recalled, the more
prosocial behavior they would commit subsequently.
Previous immorality motivates moral compensatory behavior
through guilt. This finding extended our existing understanding
of the effect of guilt (Tangney et al., 2007; Gino et al., 2009; Sheikh
and Janoff-Bulman, 2010) and supported the guilt-motivation
perspective of moral cleansing (Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006; Xu
et al., 2014). Specifically, the mediation model showed two sub-
processes of moral cleansing. That is, previous immorality firstly
leads to a sense of guilt, and secondly, this feeling of psychological
distress motivates moral compensatory behavior. Further, the
more immoral the recalled action is, the stronger is the feeling
of guilt, and the higher is the prosocial behavior that is elicited.
Besides, previous immorality also had a direct effect on moral
compensatory behavior after controlling for the role of guilt.
This suggested a possibility that previous immorality motivates
moral cleansing directly as well as through other psychological
tension.
The centrality of moral identity can facilitate the direct process
from previous immorality to moral compensatory behavior.
The findings supported Zhong et al.’s (2010) assumption and
were consistent with the results of Mulder and Aquino’s (2013)
research. Extending Mulder and Aquino’s (2013) study, the
FIGURE 1 | The moderated mediation model. ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
present study examined the moderating role of moral identity
in the process of moral cleansing, with the role of guilt
considered. The results showed that moral identity could act as
a moderator in the direct process from previous immorality to
moral compensatory behavior, as presented in Figure 1. That is,
as compared with a person with low centrality of moral identity
(low-MI), a high-MI person (moral identity is more central
to him/her) is more inclined to compensate for their previous
immorality and subsequently act more prosocially. Additionally,
we presumed that the significantly direct process from previous
immorality to moral compensatory behavior might be attributed
to some other moral emotions (e.g., shame) or to psychological
tension. Then, the centrality of moral identity may promote
moral cleansing through evoking a feeling of shame or distress,
which needs further exploration in future research.
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FIGURE 2 | The relationship between recalled immorality and helping time for high and low levels of moral identity.
FIGURE 3 | The relationship between recalled immorality and guilt for high and low levels of moral identity.
More importantly, our finding on the interplay between guilt
and moral identity helps to explain how guilt was elicited and
influenced by moral identity in moral cleansing. It contributed
to an adequate understanding of moral compensation. The
results presented in Table 2 and Figure 3 indicated that
the centrality of moral identity could facilitate the process
from previous immorality to guilt. This finding supported
the self-consistency theory (Barkan et al., 2015) and the self-
comparison model of moral compensation (West and Zhong,
2015). When people recollect their own past immoral behavior,
the inconsistency between one’s self-conception and real conduct
will lead to a sense of incompleteness and guilt. That is to
say, they will feel guilt when they find themselves falling
short of their existing moral identity. Thus, when moral
identity is more important/central, the discrepancy between
moral self-perception and the immorality of the recalled event
is more pronounced, and people experience higher levels of
guilt.
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Interestingly, the demonstrated moderated mediation also
contributes to explain moral consistency, in addition to moral
inconsistency (e.g., moral compensation). The findings of the
current study can help to explain why immoral behavior was
followed by immoral behavior for some people (Zhong and
Liljenquist, 2006; Martens et al., 2010). For low-MI people, their
immoral act is consistent with their low moral identity. Therefore,
it is possible that low-MI people mostly have no or just a low
extent of discrepancy between immoral acts and moral identity,
so they will experience less guilt or psychological distress. Low-
MI people often continue their immoral behavior, but not moral
compensatory behavior, after immoral acts.
Above all, combined with previous findings (Mulder and
Aquino, 2013; Xu et al., 2014) and the self-consistency theory,
the present study proposed and tested the moderated mediation
model to show the mechanism underlying moral cleansing. The
findings clarified and highlighted the vital importance of moral
identity and guilt in moral self-regulation and the equilibrium
of moral behavior. Specifically, previous immorality could not
only motivate moral compensatory acts directly, but also through
guilt. Besides, moral identity could facilitate the processes of
evoking guilt and subsequent prosocial behavior by previous
immorality. To sum up, the present study revealed that moral
cleansing was observed among Chinese participants, and the
findings showed us a framework to explain moral compensation
with reference to the interplay between guilt and moral identity.
Several limitations should be addressed here. First, the
present study only focused on the role of guilt, which may
ignore the effects of other moral emotions in the process
of moral compensation, such as shame. Therefore, other
mediators should be distinguished in future studies. Second,
the tendency of subsequent prosocial behavior was used to
indicate participants’ subsequent compensatory behavior. A gap
between the tendency and actual behavior may affect the results.
Hence, measures for the actual behavior should be considered
in future studies. Third, the present study only focused on the
internalization dimension of moral identity and did not put
the role of the symbolization dimension (Jordan et al., 2011)
into our consideration. Future research can integrate the two
dimensions of moral identity to uncover the mechanism of moral
cleansing.
Despite these limitations, to our knowledge, this is the
first time to probe into the mechanism underlying moral
compensation from a comprehensive perspective of combining
guilt and moral identity. This study revealed a dynamic model
on how people adapt moral behavior to protect their moral
self-image. Furthermore, since the research was carried out
on a Chinese population, it offers us a glimpse of the cross-
cultural differences. Actually, it does not point at differences,
but shows that despite the different cultural background, the
same psychological processes of ethical dissonance and moral
cleansing equally apply to Chinese participants. Finally, from
the perspective of application, the present findings also have
important implications for motivating the prosocial behaviors
of “sinners.” Practical efforts should concentrate on eliciting the
discrepancy between sinners’ desired state (moral identity) and
their current state (recalling his own previous immorality) to
induce their subsequent prosocial behaviors.
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